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Introduction 
The McKinsey Global Institute, an economic think-tank, last year published a 
report on global housing. The report finds that City dwellers globally pay $650bn 
a year more on housing costs than they can afford and wages of low income 
earners lag growth in housing costs leading to greater income inequality and 
out-migration of skilled workers. The availability of affordable housing reduces 
the entry costs of doing business for companies and employees and increases 
demand for secondary services like food and drink retailers. A city’s productivity 
increases when lower income earners are assimilated more fully into the 
economy. In other words rising disposable income will add to the City’s GDP. 
The report identifies ‘idle land’ as the significant problem, whether it is zoning 
restrictions or political difficulties in building on government controlled land. 
Clearly there is an affordability problem for low-income individuals and families 
and the inevitable peril of exorbitant rent increases. The lack of supply pushes up 
housing costs. Without affordable housing, because of supply shortages, a tighter 
labour market ensues (wage inflation) and consequently an upward spiral in 
housing costs and rents. 
 
Mia Farrow, rent control and the law of unintended consequences 
 
Policy makers and some policy advisers have put rent control forward as the 
solution. Rent control places a maximum price (rent ceiling) on the price (rent) 
of housing. The intention here is to make housing more affordable. However, the 
unintended consequence is to do the opposite. In the first instance supply falls as 
those who supply accommodation run the additional risk of not getting the 
required return on their investments.  Demand increases because potential 
buyers postpone the purchasing decision and seek rented accommodation 
instead. The shortage is now greater under rent control than the market 
outcome. In classical economic theory, high prices act as a market signal that 
demand exceeds supply and the market reacts by increasing supply leading to 
lower prices. This is what Adam Smith called the ‘invisible hand’ of the market 
place that guides buyers and sellers behaviour. When this market signal is 
removed the available space is now rationed out by means other than market 
pricing – none of them pleasant. 
If one thinks that opposition to rent control is the preserve of right-wing 
economists consider the view of Nobel Laureate Gunnar Myrdal, the architect of 
Sweden’s Welfare State who stated that ‘rent control has in certain Western 
countries constituted, maybe, the worst example of poor planning by 
governments lacking courage and vision’.  The economist and socialist Assar 
Lindbeck memorably said that ‘rent control is the best way to destroy a city 
apart from bombing it’.  
It is not just actual rent control but the mere threat of its introduction that deters 
investment in housing. Policy makers may insist that any form of rent control 
may be a temporary measure. But perhaps we should remember that income tax 
was first introduced in the U.S.  as a temporary measure to pay for the cost of 
World War 1. With rent control, developers move into other areas of investment 
in real estate not under control, perhaps into luxury apartments. In other words 
rent control creates an incentive to built for the wealthy and elite. Furthermore 
the elite and wealthy can take advantage of rent control because sellers 
(landlords) can discriminate. Most documented examples from New York were 
Mia Farrow, Faye Dunaway and Ed Koch all occupying rent controlled 
apartments at significantly below market prices. Other forms of discrimination 
surface – discrimination against colour, race, single parents, and the 
handicapped. In addition, housing units fall into disrepair during the period of 
rent control because of inability to pay for repairs.  
When all these ‘hidden costs’ are added the ‘real price’ of units may be higher 
than even the market price. This is not a transfer from landlords to those who 
are renting but in economic jargon it constitutes a deadweight loss. 
 
 
Rent Control – the German experience 
While New York’s experiment with rent control is used as a textbook example of 
the unintended consequences of price ceilings, Germany is often seen as the 
poster child of such controls.  About 22m households live in rented 
accommodation in Germany. This very high rate is partly explained by tenancy 
law that gives renters security of tenure but Germany also has tight rent 
controls. The law militates against amateur landlords who may want to buy 
housing units for capital gain. This has the effect of ring fencing rented 
accommodation and the presence of institutional investors. On the other hand, 
while owner occupation is discouraged in Germany here in Ireland, as it is in 
Britain, governments subsidise home ownership. 
Ireland’s Central Bank’s 20% income requirement is a prudent measure to 
stabilize banks following the collapse of the banking sector. However, this 
effectively amounts to an effort to control demand and excludes many low-
income earners from home ownership, which increases demand for rented 
accommodation putting upward pressure on rents. 
 
Market Failure 
The housing market is inflexible because the forces of supply and demand are 
not sensitive to price changes. Property cycles and slumps are indicative of the 
struggle to arrive at stable market prices. There are lengthy production time –
lags where it can take years to complete a house from the initial planning stage. 
With all the other ‘structural rigidities’ such as zoning and the political 
difficulties in building on government controlled land, it is not surprising to find 
price instability within the property market. 
The construction industry has a distinguishing feature that, in theory at least, can 
account for its cyclical nature. The investment decision to build is influenced by 
current market prices and therefore the supply of houses built in the future is 
reliant on historical prices. Currently, demand exceeds supply and prices are 
high and this, after the time-lag,  incentivices building programmes. 
Consequently, this depresses prices and a fall in the number of houses built. This 
is followed by a contraction in supply and higher prices. Equilibrium is never 




With demand exceeding supply the cost of building land (with planning 
permission) rises dramatically and this leads to higher house prices. Kate Allen 
of the Financial Times reported that in Britain, land with planning permission to 
build houses is worth “260 times what it would be as farmland”. This could be 
taxed and revenues used to provide social housing.  Allen reports that in South 
Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan national land banks “acquire land for residential 
development, improve it and then sell it onto developers”. Her report also notes 
that in Singapore “80% of the population live in homes built by the government”.  
Dublin has a supply shortage and more housing units are necessary. Not doing so 
creates a clear division between those who own their own home and those who 
do not. Kate Barker, author of the UK Review of Housing Supply, describes this as 
the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. Those who ‘have’ enjoy capital appreciation and 





Lack of affordable housing is socially undesirable, increases income inequality, 
leads to outward migration of skilled workers and a fall in city gross domestic 
product. Research points to idle land as a significant problem along with zoning 
restrictions and political difficulties in building on government controlled land. 
There are clear unintended consequences in introducing rent controls in line 
with the New York experiences. The European model of large-scale institutional 
investment combined with rent restrictions, tenancy law and ringfencing is 
certainly appealing. However, a move in this direction would necessitate cultural 
and political change to discourage subsidizing home ownership.  
There is international empirical evidence supporting successful government 
provision of housing in the form of national acquisition of housing land banks. 
Current government policies on housing leads to: 
• Inequality 
• High housing benefits 
• Restrictions on supply 
• Unproductive investment (untaxed capital gains on housing) 
 
The supply of housing must increase but given the construction market’s 
structural rigidities building on the scale needed is problematic. Lighter planning 
controls would aid substantial house completions. In addition, a land value tax 
would encourage more intensive use of valuable land.  
